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Abstract
Studies of disaggregated international price data document a robust, positive relationship between nominal
exchange (NER) volatility and the variability of international relative prices. This relationship is interpreted as
evidence that sticky prices rather than trade frictions are the source of the large law of one price deviations across
locations. This paper disputes this interpretation. We show that a micro-founded, state-dependent sticky price model
generates a hump-shaped, rather than positive relationship between relative price variability (RPV) and NER volatility.
The hump occurs earlier for more tradable goods, whose producers adjust more frequently in a model calibrated to
match the excessively large volatility of nominal exchange rates observed in the data. We ﬁnd strong support for the
model’s predictions using a dataset of actual good prices collected in 12 Eastern European cities in a very volatile
environment. In contrast, the model performs poorly when tested using a dataset of CPI-based real exchange rates for
74 countries. Lack of a hump-shaped relationship in the aggregate data is only consistent wi t ham i c r o - f o u n d e ds t i c k y
price model if international goods market are suﬃciently segmented so that large nominal exchange rate movements
have little eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts.
JEL classiﬁcations: E30, F41.
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I na na t t e m p tt ou n c o v e rt h es o u r c eo ft h el a r g es w i ngs in the real exchange rates across countries,
Engel (1993, 1999) and Rogers and Jenkins (1995) have forcefully argued that deviations from the law of one
price for identical goods across countries rather than movements of relative prices within a country account
for most of the volatility of real exchange rates. These authors’ ﬁndings have challenged the ability of the
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis to explain short-term real exchange rate ﬂuctuations and gave rise to a surge
in empirical work using disaggregated relative price data. This line of research, pioneered by Engel and
Rogers (1996) in their work with US-Canadian relative prices, has documented that national borders are an
important source of market segmentation. The border between Canada and US generates as much volatility
of relative prices for two cities as 75,000 miles of distance would for cities within a country1. The US-Japan
border is even wider: 70,000 times the distance from the Earth to the Sun2.
Tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers, language and diﬀerences in distribution networks, as well as relative wage
movements across countries have been used to explain the large impact borders have on deviations from the
law of one price, but no story has received as much attention as the one of sticky prices coupled with nominal
exchange rate shocks. Relative prices across countries, at all levels of aggregation, track nominal exchange
rates closely, as documented by Isard (1977), Giovaninni (1988) or Mussa (1986). More recent work using
bilateral disaggregated price data has documented that the volatility of nominal exchange rates has a positive
eﬀect on the variability of relative prices across countries and accounts for a large portion of the eﬀect of
national borders on international price dispersion3.T h i s ﬁnding, coupled with the small eﬀect distance is
found to have on the volatility of relative prices across locations, is responsible for the popularity of nominal
rather than real (trade-based) frictions as an explanation for international relative price movements.
The purpose of this paper is to ask whether the pervasive positive relationship between nominal
exchange rate and relative price variability, as well as the small role tradeability is found to play in generating
relative price movements is indeed consistent with a sticky price model. To answer this question we depart
from standard models frequently used in open economy macroeconomics4, models which assume an exogenous
1Engel and Rogers (1996).
2Parsley and Wei (2001a).
3Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001), Parsley and Wei (2001a, 2001b)
4See Lane (2001) for a survey of the New Keynesian Open Economy literature.
1frequency and timing of price changes, and therefore predict a positive relationship between nominal exchange
rate volatility and the volatility of relative prices.
In a model in which nominal rigidities arise endogenously, due to ﬁxed (menu) costs ﬁrms pay to
adjust their prices, higher nominal exchange rate volatility has two eﬀects on the volatility of international
relative prices. One is the direct eﬀect: nominal exchange rates are used to compute relative prices and higher
NER volatility increases relative price variability. On the other hand, as the volatility of nominal exchange
rates increases, ﬁrms tend to adjust prices more frequently and therefore more readily correct relative price
ﬂuctuations induced by nominal shocks. Which of these two eﬀe c t si ss t r o n g e r 5?
To answer this question, we embed two frictions, trade costs and menu costs of price adjustment, in a
small open economy model with diﬀerentiated goods and monopolistic competition in the goods market. Trade
costs play an important role in the model. Firms that face small trade costs have high export shares, and allow
smaller law of one price deviations because they reprice more frequently: relative price ﬂuctuations are costlier
for these ﬁrms as, given the lower costs of arbitrage, they translate into more volatile movements in quantities.
In contrast to standard sticky price models, we ﬁnd that the state-dependent model generates a hump-shaped
relationship between the volatility of nominal exchange rates and that of relative prices. In environments
in which the volatility of nominal exchange rates is small, prices adjust infrequently: relative prices inherit
the properties of nominal exchange rates and higher NER volatility increases the size of deviations from the
law of one price. As NER volatility increases, ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to pay the menu costs and adjust more
readily. More frequent adjustment breaks the tight link between nominal and real relative prices and higher
NER volatility, through its eﬀect on the frequency of price changes, lowers the variability of relative prices.
Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) have documented that high inﬂation countries have a lower volatil-
ity of real exchange rates relative to that of nominal exchange rates and have shown that a model with en-
dogenously segmented markets can replicate this behavior. Moreover, Burstein (2002) shows that the eﬀect
of nominal shocks on real activity is smaller in high inﬂation environments as ﬁrms adjust more frequently
in the presence of ﬁxed costs of adjusting prices, and argues that a state-dependent pricing model can also
5Devereux and Yetman (2002) tackle a related question (the relationship between exchange rate pass-through and inﬂation)
in the context of a time-dependent model in which ﬁrms adjust prices at random intervals, in a Calvo fashion, but choose the
(ex-ante) optimal frequency of price changes given a cost of price adjustment.
2reproduce the lower ratio of real to nominal exchange rate volatility in high inﬂation environments. Our
open economy state-dependent pricing model delivers however a stronger result. According to the model, real
exchange rate volatility itself should eventually decrease with higher nominal exchange rate volatility.
We employ both aggregate and disaggregated price data to test the predictions of the model. We ﬁrst
use a dataset of actual goods prices and show that the model’s results are not simply a theoretical curiosum.
The model predicts that in environments in which the frequency of price changes is high, larger NER volatility
should decrease the volatility of relative prices. We turn to the market for agricultural products sold in open-
air markets, a volatile environment in which prices are changed frequently, to test this prediction of the model.
Using data on the prices of 58 products collected biweekly over a three year period in 12 Eastern European
cities, we indeed ﬁnd, using gravity-type equations, that city-pairs that are subject to larger shocks to the
nominal exchange rates experience smaller deviations from the law of one price. Moreover, using period-by-
period measures of relative price variability ﬁrst employed by Parsley and Wei (2000) in an open-economy
context, we also ﬁnd that periods in which the volatility of nominal exchange rates is larger are characterized
by less relative price variability, consistent with the predictions of the menu costs model.
The model fares worse however when applied to aggregate data. Using monthly CPI and nominal
exchange rate data for 74 countries for the post-Bretton-Woods period, we ﬁnd that the volatility of monthly
changes in real exchange rates increases with larger nominal exchange rate volatility even for pairs of countries
that have suﬀered from excessive nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Only for changes in real exchange rates
at horizons of a year or more do we observe a hump-shaped relationship between real and nominal exchange
rate volatility. We conclude thus that international goods markets are suﬃciently segmented and nominal
exchange rate movements are only a minor determinant of the ﬁrms’ price adjustment strategies6.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the relationship
between relative price variability and nominal exchange rate volatility that the model generates. Section 4
discusses the data and presents the results of the gravity equations. Section 5 concludes. Appendices discuss
the solution method used to solve the model and present some robustness checks.




The world consists of two countries, Home and Foreign. Each country is inhabited by a continuum
of identical consumers and a continuum of ﬁrms. Consumers buy goods from both Home and Foreign ﬁrms
and supply labor to ﬁrms in their own country. They own local ﬁrms and consume their proﬁts. In addition,
consumers in both countries have access to a complete set of state-contingent securities denominated in
Home’s currency. We assume that Home is small relative to Foreign so that Foreign variables are unaﬀected
by shocks in the Home economy. We make this assumption in order to maintain computational tractability
and to allow the use of non-linear solution techniques.
We describe the problem of the agents in Home. Foreign agents solve identical problems and asterisks
are appended to their variables. Throughout, let st denote the event realized at time t, st = {s0,s 1,...,st}
the history of events up to this period and π(st) the probability of a particular history as of time 0.
Consumers
A representative consumer has preferences over a continuum of goods indexed by z ∈ (0,1). For each
good z, two closely substitutable varieties, one produced in Home and another in Foreign, are available for
consumption. The consumer optimally allocates her income across the diﬀerent goods in the consumption
basket, and decides, for each good, the optimal quantity to be imported from abroad. Letting C(z,i;st)


















































gator over the two (Home and Foreign) varieties of good z. θ and γ are the elasticity of substitution across
goods and varieties, respectively. p(z;st) is the price of the domestically produced variety of z, p∗(z;st)i s
the (Foreign currency) price of the Foreign variety. e is the exchange rate, denominated in units of Home
per Foreign currency. τ(z) is an iceberg trade cost the consumer incurs in order to purchase goods from
abroad: to consume 1 unit of the foreign good, τ(z) > 1 must be purchased. We broadly interpret τ as costs
of international trade, which include both physical costs (trade and non-trade barriers, shipping costs), but
also subjective costs, such as a bias in preferences towards the consumption of domestically produced goods.
Goods diﬀer according to their tradeability: we calibrate G(τ), the distribution of trade costs across goods,
below. χ(st+1|st) is the price of a bond that pays 1 unit of Home currency if state st+1 is realized tomorrow.
b(st+1) is the quantity of state-contingent bonds the consumer purchases. Finally, Π(st) are the proﬁts earned
by all Home ﬁrms and n(st) is the household’s supply of labor. Implicit in this formulation of the budget
constraint is the convention that consumers own only their country’s ﬁrms7.
We can solve the consumer’s problem in several stages, using a duality approach. First, given prices,
and a desired level of consumption of any particular good z, C(z), the consumer chooses her consumption















7This, as well as the restriction that state-contingent bonds are denominated in Home’s currency, are notational conventions,
rather than assumptions. Given the availability of a complete set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities, any additional
asset in this economy is redundant (it does not aﬀect equilibrium allocations), as it can be constructed using a combination of
the state-contingent bonds available for trade. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) employ a similar convention.
5where we drop the dependence on st as this is a static problem. The ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem












Letting P(z) be the Home price index for good z,d e ﬁned as the minimum amount a Home consumer must





















The share of good z imported from abroad depends on the price the Foreign ﬁrm charges (in Home currency
terms), times the good’s shipping cost, relative to a consumption-weighted average price of the Home and
Foreign varieties of this good. The problem we study is thus a generalization of the standard trade-cost
model, exposited, for example, in Sercu, Uppal and van Hulle (1995), in which Home and Foreign varieties of
a good are perfect substitutes (γ →∞ ), and consumers purchase only the cheapest variety of a given good.
An argument similar to the one above can be used to show that the rule according to which consumers



































where Un,U c are the derivatives of the utility function with respect to its arguments.
Foreign consumers face a similar problem. In our exercises, we assume that the Foreign economy is
large compared to the Home economy. We do so formally by assuming that there is a unit mass of home agents
and the Foreign’s population is N times larger, where N →∞ . We also assume that Foreign consumers place











and ω∗ → 0. Without this assumption, Home ﬁrms will de-facto sell only abroad independent of the size of
their trade costs and this would preclude us from studying the role of tradeability in the model. Foreign
















is the aggregate price of good z f r o mt h ep e r s p e c t i v eo ft h eF o r e i g na g e n t .N o t eh e r et h ec o n s e q u e n c eo fo u r
assumption that ω∗ → 0 : Foreign prices and quantities are independent of disturbances originating in Home.
Nevertheless, because Foreign is large relative to Home, total demand for Home goods is non-zero.
To pin down the nominal exchange rate in this model, we make use of the Euler equation that governs












Equations (6) and (7) together imply that the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption in Home







where Λ is a constant that depends on initial conditions. We normalize it to ensure that e =1i nt h e
steady-state.
8The problem we study here is standard in many aspects and we only present the model’s key equations. We refer the reader
to Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) for additional details.
8Firms
Firms set a unique price p(z;st)o rp∗(z;st) denominated in their own country’s currency9.B o t h
countries’ consumers buy at this price. Customers from abroad pay an additional (iceberg) trade cost τ(z)−1:
in order to consume 1 unit of the good, τ(z)m u s tb ep u r c h a s e d .
Labor is the sole variable input in production: the ﬁrm’s technology is y(z)=l(z)α where l(z)i st h e
quantity of labor the ﬁrm uses for production. Firms also have menu costs of adjusting prices: the ﬁrm must
hire ξ(z) additional units of labor every time it resets its price. ξ diﬀers across ﬁrms: more on this point










Uc(C(s0),n(s0)) is the t-period ahead stochastic discount factor, and Π(z;st)a r et h eﬁrm’s















P(st) is the additional cost the ﬁrm must pay every time it reprices, D(z;st) is total demand (we


















Note that per-capita demand from Foreign consumers is τ(z)C∗(z,h), as, given a desired level of consumption
C∗(z,h), the consumer must purchase a total of τ(z)C∗(z,h) units, of which a fraction melts in transit. We
assume parameter values in the Foreign economy that ensure that per-capita consumption and aggregate
price levels are equal in both countries at the steady state: C = C∗,P= P∗ and that ω∗γN =1 . T h e s e
9Here we depart from the standard local currency pricing New Keynesian open economy models in that we assume that
producers cannot segment across markets. The wedge between the foreign and domestic price of a Home-produced variety arises
solely due to the transport cost. We do so because assuming local currency pricing implictly rules out international goods market
arbitrage and does not allow us to study the role of tradeability.
9assumptions imply that, at the steady-state, a Home ﬁrm which faces no trade costs treats the Home and




We introduce money by imposing a quantity theory money demand and assuming unitary velocity:
P(st)C(st)=M(st), and similarly for the Foreign economy. The Foreign money supply is assumed constant.
This, as well as the assumption that Foreign preferences are heavily skewed towards the consumption of
Foreign goods (ω∗ −→ 0), implies that Foreign aggregate variables are constant at their steady-state values.







The equilibrium is a sequence of prices P(st),P(z;st),p(z;st),e(st),W(st),χ(st+1|st), and allocations
n(st),C(z,i,st),b(st+1)t h a ta r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hﬁrm and household maximization, and satisfy the market-
clearing and resource constraints.
We normalize all nominal variables by the money supply in this economy, e.g., ˜ P(st)=
P(st)
M(st), in order
to render the state-space of this problem bounded. Let ˜ p−1(z,st)=
˜ p(z,st−1)
M(st) ∈ P be a ﬁrm’s (normalized)
last period’s price and T =[τmin,τmax] the support of the distribution of transport costs. The aggregate state
of this economy is an inﬁnite-dimensional object, consisting of the growth rate of money in this economy: g,
but also of the endogenously varying joint distribution of last period’s ﬁrm prices and transport costs. Let
µ : P×T → [0,1] denote this distribution and Γ its law of motion: µ0 = Γ(g,µ). We follow Krusell and Smith
(1997) and approximate µ with a ﬁnite-dimensional vector of moments in order to allow use of numerical
solution techniques to solve the model. The unknown functions that characterize the equilibrium of this
economy are solved for via collocation, a functional approximation technique. In particular, we approximate
the unknown functions (aggregate prices and quantities, the endogenous law of motion for µ,a sw e l la s
the ﬁrm’s value functions) with linear combinations of orthogonal polynomials, and solve for the unknown
coeﬃcients on these polynomials by requiring that the equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed at a ﬁnite number
of nodes along the state-space.
To solve the ﬁrm’s problem, let Ξ = {g,µ} collect the aggregate state variables, Π(ˆ p)=D(ˆ p)
ˆ p
ˆ P −





ˆ P be the ﬁrm’s proﬁts (exclusive of menu costs), ˜ p−1 =
p−1
M be the ﬁrm’s last period’s price, V a(τ;Ξ)
denote the value of adjustment of a ﬁrm with trade cost τ,a n dV n(˜ p−1,τ;Ξ)b et h eﬁrm’s value of inaction.
Then, letting V =m a x ( V a,Vn)d e n o t et h eﬁrm’s value, the following two functional equations characterize
the ﬁrm’s problem recursively:



















where we follow Khan and Thomas (2001) and normalize the ﬁrm’s value functions by the marginal utility











An appendix discusses the solution method in more detail.
3. The relationship between RPV and NER volatility
A. Parametrization and calibration





This speciﬁcation follows Hansen (1985) by assuming indivisible labor decisions implemented with
lotteries. The length of the period is one month and we set the discount factor equal to β = .997. The value
of ψ is chosen to ensure that households work 30% of their discretionary time in the steady state. We follow
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and set κ = 5 so that the model produces suﬃciently large movements in
real exchange rates. The elasticity of substitution across goods is set equal to θ = 3 to highlight the fact that
11goods are imperfect substitutes, a lower bound of the range of elasticities used in closed-economy models11.
On the other hand, varieties of a good are closely substitutable, and we set γ =1 5 , somewhat higher than the
estimates reported by Hummels (2001) using disaggregated international trade data, in order to study the
behavior of relative prices for almost identical Home and Foreign varieties of a given good. We interpret the
production function y = lα as reﬂecting the fact that other factors of production are ﬁx e di nt h es h o r t - r u n .
The share of labor is set to α = 2
3, a typical choice in the business cycle literature.
To calibrate the distribution of trade costs, we turn to the US Imports and Exports Data compiled
by Robert Feenstra. This dataset contains information on the total value of exports by manufacturing ﬁrms
at the SIC 4-digit level for 1958-1994. We supplement this dataset with the NBER Productivity Database
which contains, among others, data on total shipments for these industries. Using the two sets of data, we
calculate export shares for 396 industries for 199312. Based on these shares, we calculate (weighted by size of
the industry) second, third and fourth moments of the distribution of export shares that we ask the model
to match. We do not use the US data to match the mean of this distribution, because US is a relatively
closed economy and because the disaggregated data is available only for the manufacturing sector. Instead,
we turn to the OECD STAN Indicators Database for 1993 for shares for most of the OECD countries. Table 1
presents the OECD STAN data we use: the average OECD economy exports 11.87% of its production abroad.
We assume a parametric functional form for the distribution of trade costs G(τ) : the beta distribution, for
its ﬂexibility. The two parameters of the distribution are chosen so that the model delivers moments of the
export shares distribution close to those in the data. Table 2 presents the moments in the data we target
and the ones implied by the distribution of trade costs we work with: G(τ)= b e t a ( a1,a 2)w i t ha1 =3 .4
and a2 = 13. Trade costs range in the model from 2% to 48%, with a mean of 20% (¯ τ =1 .2). This large
dispersion of trade costs across varieties is consistent with results from earlier work that has provided direct
measurements of the size of transport costs. A notable example is Hummels (2001) who has assembled an
extensive dataset of freight rates for 2-digit SITC industries for US and several other countries. He ﬁnds large
dispersion in freight rates, both across commodities, but also across transportation modes: average freight
11See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) for a brief survey.
12We have discovered several errors for the 1994 dataset downloaded from the UC Davis website and went back one year in
time to avoid them.
12rates range from 3.5% (Oﬃce Machines) to 28.6% (Coal, Coke) for US, and are as large as 50% for other
countries.
We ﬁnally assume that menu costs of price adjustment ξ(z)d i ﬀer across ﬁrms: ﬁrms pay 1.2% of
their steady state revenues each time they adjust prices. Firms that sell more abroad face larger menu costs
because of their larger market shares. We make this assumption in order to ensure that our result that more
tradeable ﬁrms adjust more frequently is not simply due to the fact that these ﬁrms have smaller menu costs
relative to their revenues. Our choice of menu costs implies that ﬁrms adjust every 7 months on average for
monetary shocks of a size similar to that in the US data, an average price duration somewhat larger than
that reported by Bils and Klenow (2002) for a large dataset of consumer prices in the US economy, and is
consistent with the evidence presented by Zbaracki et. al. (2004) who study the price adjustment practices
of a large US manufacturing ﬁrm.
We use the model to ask how goods prices respond to movements in exchange rates, and require
the model to generate nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations consistent with those observed in the data. We
therefore assume a process for the growth rate of the money supply to ensure that nominal exchange rates
follow, in equilibrium, a random walk process:
loge(st)=l o ge(st−1)+²(st) (11)
where ² ∼ N(0,σ2)13. We vary σ in simulations to study how the variability of relative prices depends on the
volatility of changes in nominal exchange rates. To be clear, even though the nominal exchange rate follow
a random-walk subject to random disturbances, it does not constitute an exogenous variable in the model.
Rather, the growth rate of the money supply is calibrated in order to generate realistic nominal exchange
rate ﬂuctuations.
B. Results
The only source of aggregate ﬂuctuations in this economy are shocks to the growth rate of the money
supply. The mechanism through which a monetary impulse propagates in the Home Economy is reminiscent
13Using the risk-sharing condition, and the functional form of the utility function assumed above, the growth rate of the money
supply follows: log
M(st)
M(st−1) =( 1− k)log
C(st)
C(st−1) + ²(st).
13of that at play in standard models with nominal rigidities: a monetary expansion, given sluggish price
adjustment, increases the purchasing power of Home’s agents, whose consumption increases. As a result, the
real wage rate increases, as the increase in consumption lowers the marginal utility of every additional (real)
dollar earned in the labor market and households require higher real wages. Faced with higher marginal
costs of production (arising both because of the higher real wages, but also because of a movement along
an upward sloping marginal cost curve, as α < 1), those ﬁrms whose prices are too far away from the
optimum choose to pay the menu costs and reset their nominal prices. Finally, the nominal exchange rate
depreciates, initially overshooting the increase in the money supply, and thus exhibiting more volatility than
fundamentals, a result similar to that of Dornbusch (1976). We quantify, in Table 3, the strength of each
of these eﬀects, by calculating the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates (ﬁltered using a ﬁrst-diﬀerence
operator) for simulations of the model in environments where the volatility of nominal shocks is σ = .01 and
σ = .03, respectively. Note that, when the volatility of nominal shocks is low, consumption growth rates are
7.4 times less volatile than nominal exchange rate changes. while real wages, real exchange rates, and money
supply are almost 1.5 times less volatile than nominal exchange rates. As the environment becomes more
volatile, ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to adjust prices more frequently, and business cycle ﬂuctuations are dampened
in the σ = .03 economy (relative to the volatility of nominal shocks), while the ratio of real to nominal
exchange rate volatility decreases, results similar to those of Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) in a model
with endogenously segmented markets.
We next turn to the behavior of producers. Figure 1 depicts a ﬁrm’s value of inaction: V n,a n d
adjustment, V a, as a function of the log-deviation of the ﬁrm’s price from its optimum14,w h e na l lo t h e r
variables are at their steady-state levels. We plot these functions for two ﬁrms: one that sells tradeable goods
(τ =1 .02), and one whose good is virtually untradeable, at the upper end of the distribution of trade costs in
the model: τ =1 .48. The two functions are normalized so that the maximum a ﬁrm’s value of not changing
its price can reach is 1.
If the ﬁrm adjusts, it resets the price to its optimal level: the ﬁrm’s value of adjustment is therefore
independent of p−1. The best a ﬁrm can do by not adjusting is if its past price coincides with today’s optimum:
14The standard deviation of nominal shocks is σ = .01 in the exercises of Figures 1 and 2.
14the ﬁr m ’ sv a l u eo fi n a c t i o ni nt h i sc a s ee x c e e d st h ev a l u eo fa d j u s t m e n tb yt h es i z eo ft h em e n uc o s t .A st h e
ﬁrm’s price deviates away from the optimum, the value of inaction falls and is eventually lower than the value
of changing its price; the intersection of the two value functions determines the region of inaction — the (S,s)
bands.
Notice also, in the right panel of Figure 1, that a ﬁrm’s value of inaction is much more sensitive
to deviations of the ﬁrm’s price from its optimum if the ﬁrm’s product is more tradeable. Intuitively, if
trade costs are low, Home and Foreign agents switch more easily towards the cheapest variety of a particular
good: relative price changes therefore generate larger ﬂuctuations in demand, and therefore marginal costs
for producers of more tradeable products. This in turn implies that the inaction region is wider for the high
transport cost ﬁrm (despite our assumption that menu costs are proportional to steady-state revenues and
therefore lower for high trade-cost ﬁrms): it tolerates prices as far as 4% away from its optimum. A low
trade-cost ﬁrm adjusts more readily, every time its price deviates from the optimum by 1.5% in absolute
value.
Figure 2 plots the two ﬁrms’ price functions, conditional on adjustment, p,a sw e l la st h e( S,s)b a n d s
of price adjustment, as a function of the nominal shock, ε. Prices are expressed as deviations of the price
from the steady-state optimum. Note that optimal price functions are similar to those the ﬁrm would employ
in a ﬂexible price world (a 45-degree line) in which prices increase one-for-one with the nominal shock. This
result is driven by the fact that nominal wages and exchange rates are proportional to each other (because
of our assumption of an inﬁnitely elastic Frisch labor supply): W ∼ P
U0(C) ∼ e, and exhibit a random-walk
behavior. An important component of the ﬁrm’s marginal costs is therefore unforecastable based on current
information. Moreover, even though a, say, monetary expansion increases aggregate consumption and thus the
marginal cost of production, ﬁrms that do adjust in times of a monetary expansion set prices that are higher
than those of other ﬁrms in the economy who have not yet responded to the nominal shock: substitution by
consumers towards the cheaper goods thus reduces these ﬁrms’ total sales and hence their marginal costs.
These two opposite eﬀects cancel each other out for our choice of parameter values. Because adjusting ﬁrms
respond one-for-one to a nominal shock, the law of one price holds for ﬁrms who have just reset their prices:
relative price variability is thus solely a function of the frequency of price adjustment and the volatility of
15nominal exchange rates in this environment. Note again in the ﬁgure that (S,s) bands of price adjustment
are wider for ﬁrms that sell less tradeable goods. Moreover, the width of these bands is unaﬀected by the
size of the nominal disturbance.
We illustrate the key predictions of the model in panels B and C of Table 3. Note that diﬀerences
in trade costs induce large diﬀerences in the frequency of price changes: ﬁrms with small (τ =1 .02) trade
costs adjust every 2.7 months when the volatility of nominal shocks is equal to 1%. In contrast, high trade
cost ﬁrms adjust much less frequently: every 29 months on average. In environments with higher nominal
exchange rate volatility (σ =3 % )a l lﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to pay the menu costs and adjust their prices more
frequently: low trade cost ﬁrms adjust prices every 1.4 months, whereas ﬁrms with large trade costs change
prices every other 5 months. Note in panel C of the table how these diﬀerences in the frequency of price
changes translate into diﬀerences in relative price variability, where we measure relative price variability by
the time-series standard deviation of changes in the relative price charged by Home and Foreign producers
of a given good: qt(z)=l o g
etp∗
t(z)
pt(z) . Relative prices are twice more volatile for high-trade cost ﬁrms than for
producers of more tradeable goods when the volatility of nominal exchange rates is low. In more volatile
environments, relative price variability falls for low trade cost goods (from 0.53% to 0.42%), while it increases
for goods that are traded little (from 1.1% to 2.7%).
It is helpful, at this point, to relate the predictions of this model to those of the standard trade-cost
model that assumes that goods are perfectly substitutable and arbitrage eliminates law of one price deviations
whenever these are too large. A key prediction of the standard trade-cost model is that the relative price of
t h eg o o dc a nd e v i a t ea w a yf r o mu n i t y ,b u ti sb o u n d e db yt h es i z eo ft h et r a n s p o r tc o s t :−logτ 6 qt 6 logτ.
Our discussion of Figure 2 should convince the reader that a similar behavior is implied by the menu costs
model in which goods are less-than-perfect substitutes. The ﬁrm will allow its price to deviate away from its
optimum, as long as the deviation does not exceed the S,s bands, and charge a price that (approximately)
ensures that the law of one price holds otherwise. The behavior of relative prices can then be approximated
16by:
qt =0i f q∗





t = qt−1 + ²t
where q∗
t is the relative price that would prevail in the absence of price adjustment. In the menu costs-
model the inaction bands are non-linear functions of the trade cost, elasticities of substitution, as well as the
volatility of the environment, but the similarity with the standard trade-cost model is evident. In particular,
more tradeable goods command narrower inaction regions in the menu-costs model, and allow smaller relative
price ﬂuctuations.
Figure 3 examines the relationship between relative price variability and nominal exchange rate volatil-
ity in more detail. We simulate the model for a range of σ and calculate std(∆qt) for each simulation. The
upper panels of Figure 3 present results for ﬁrms with the lowest trade cost: τ =1 .02 (left), mean trade cost:
τ =1 .20 (middle), and highest trade cost: τ =1 .48 (right). The lower panels plot the average number of pe-
riods between two consecutive adjustments. The hump-shaped relationship between relative price variability
and nominal exchange rate volatility is evident in this ﬁgure. When the volatility of nominal exchange rates
is suﬃciently low, ﬁrms adjust infrequently and relative prices inherit the properties of the nominal exchange
rate. An increase in NER volatility then increases the volatility of relative prices, a result similar to that
one obtains in standard sticky price models in which the frequency and timing of price changes is assumed
exogenous. Notice however that when pricing is state-dependent the positive relationship between nominal
exchange rate volatility and relative price variability holds only locally, in environments in which ﬁrms change
prices suﬃciently infrequently. As the frequency of price changes increases, the tight link between real and
nominal international relative prices breaks down and higher nominal exchange rate variability, through its
eﬀect on the frequency of price changes, decreases the variability of relative prices. In our calibration of the
model, whenever nominal exchange rates are suﬃciently large to induce ﬁrms to adjust prices every 2 to 3
months, higher nominal exchange rate variability decreases the volatility of relative prices.
17Note also that the hump in the relationship between NER volatility and relative price variability
occurs for lower values of σ if goods are more tradeable. Relative price variability for goods characterized by
small trade costs decreases with additional increases in the volatility of nominal exchange rates whenever the
volatility of nominal exchange rates exceeds 1%. In contrast, for ﬁrms with τ =1 .48, larger NER volatility
increases relative price variability for most of the range of our simulations: only for values of σ close to 6%
will larger NER volatility cause lower relative price variability. The diﬀerence arises because large nominal
exchange rates ﬂuctuations are necessary in order to induce high trade cost ﬁrms to adjust price suﬃciently
frequently (2-3 months) to break the link between real and nominal international relative prices.
We next turn to other measures of law of one price deviations. One of the reasons ﬁrst-diﬀerences,
rather than levels of relative prices are used in work with disaggregated price data is the interest in the
volatility of short-run LOP deviations. Suppose that the relative price of a good,q t, follows an autoregressive
process:
qt = ρqt−1 + εt.
The purpose of the gravity-type equations estimated by Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley
and Wei (2001a, 2001b) is to explain the volatility of εt rather than that of qt. Given that real exchange rates
are highly persistent, ﬁrst-diﬀerencing qt provides a good estimate of short-run shocks to the relative price,
embodied in εt. Our model, on the other hand, predicts that ρ itself varies with the volatility of nominal
exchange rates. We therefore estimate an AR(1) process for qt and plot, in Figure 4, the volatility of the
in-sample forecast errors, ˆ εt, the persistence of the relative price series, as measured by its AR(1) coeﬃcient,
ˆ ρ, as well as the unconditional volatility of relative prices, std(qt). We plot these statistics for a ﬁrm with the
median transport cost, τ =1 .2, as a function of the volatility of nominal exchange rates in each simulation
(upper panels), and, also in the τ space, for an economy in which σ = .01.
Notice, in the upper-left panel of the ﬁgure, that the persistence of relative prices declines with higher
NER volatility: when σ is close to 0, ﬁrms adjust infrequently and relative prices track nominal exchange
rates closely: the estimate of ρ is therefore close to 1. In contrast, ρ quickly decays to 0 for values of σ larger
than 3%: in this region of the parameter space ﬁrms adjust prices every 2 months and allow only transitory
18LOP deviations. As the lower-left panel of the ﬁgure indicates, diﬀerences in trade costs also induce large
diﬀerences in the persistence of relative prices across goods: ﬁrms with no trade costs allow only transitory
relative price ﬂuctuations even though the volatility of nominal exchange rates in this exercise is low (ρ is
close to 0.1). In contrast, high-trade cost ﬁrms adjust infrequently, and the relative price of these ﬁrms more
persistent (ρ is close to 0.9). Similar results hold for other measures of LOP deviations.
We ﬁnally ask how aggregate international relative prices respond to changes in the volatility of nominal
exchange rates. As Figure 5 shows, real exchange rates behave similarly to the relative price of the good with
the median trade cost with a hump at σ =2 .5%. This ﬁgure underscores the necessity of using disaggregated
price data in order to test the predictions of the state-dependent model: focusing on aggregate price indices
may hide the negative relationship between RPV and NER volatility for tradeable goods in the consumption
baskets if a large fraction of the goods in the economy are less tradeable.
4. The Data
A. Evidence from Micro-price data
Our ﬁrst empirical exercise tests the predictions of the model using a dataset of actual goods prices.
The model predicts a negative relationship between relative price variability and NER volatility in environ-
ments where ﬁrms adjust prices suﬃciently frequently (more frequently than every 2-3 months) and/or goods
in diﬀerent markets are highly tradeable/substitutable. The dataset we use is collected in precisely such an
environment: we work with prices for homogenous agricultural products sold in open open air markets, an
environment in which prices change frequently and are volatile due to seasonal demand and supply distur-
bances. The data was collected in 12 cities in six Eastern European countries by the Central Agricultural
Market Information Bureau (CAMIB15), a NGO created by an European Union project aimed at providing
informational support to food exporters in Moldova, one of the countries in the sample. Our sample covers
the years of 2000 to 200216. Prices are collected on average once every two weeks (usually during weekends)
15The data is available (in Russian and Romanian), against a nominal fee, at www.camib.org.
16An earlier version of this paper used two more years of data: 1998 and 1999, years characterized by the excessive nominal
exchange rate volatility induced by the Russian ﬁnancial crisis. We drop these years in this version of the paper because in
times of crises real exchange rate movements arise due to non-monetary factors our model abstains from. Consistent with the
predictions of the model, law of one price deviations are smaller during the years of the crisis than in the rest of the sample,
except in the periods immediately following the devaluations. Empirical results based on time-series measures of price dispersion
are not robust to alternative measures of variability as well as to diﬀerences in the estimation technique employed, perhaps due
to the increase in price dispersion immediately following the devaluations. On the other hand, cross-sectional measures of price
19in all years except for 2000, when prices are sampled weekly: a total of 83 time periods are available.
Goods in four good-categories are available: meat, fruit, vegetables, as well as a small number of
other agricultural products (oil, honey etc.). The primary purpose of the collecting agency is to provide
local entrepreneurs with information about arbitrage opportunities in domestic and foreign markets: eﬀorts
are therefore made to ensure comparability of products across locations and accuracy of the data. The
agency hires representatives in all 12 cities who sample prices several times during the day, from a number
of vendors of a given product. An average price, across all vendors surveyed, is then reported. Goods are
all homogenous (beef ribs, beef ﬁllet, apples, watermelon, shelled nuts, honey, tomatoes, etc.). In the case
of fruits and vegetables, where quality diﬀerentials can easily lead to price diﬀerences, the agency reports
the prices of both high and low quality products. Finally, most vendors set several prices for identical goods
sold in a given day due to diﬀerences in the size, quality, or color of the product. The agency treats the
most and least expensive varieties of a good as separate items and records their prices separately. We follow
this convention as well and treat high and low-quality varieties of a given product as separate goods in our
sample.
Not all prices are sampled in all periods: some goods, especially fruits and vegetables, are not sold
in open-air markets during all months of the year, and, especially during the cold season, drop out of the
sample. We therefore work only with those goods for which a panel of at least 6 cities is available in at least
75% of the time-periods in our sample. A total of 58 goods make this cutoﬀ. Table A1 in the appendix lists
the cities and goods available in our sample as well as basic statistics regarding the availability of data. Data
for all cities and goods is available at least 80% of the time, with the exception of Minsk (Belarus) where the
agency started collecting the data late in our sample. Most goods are meat products (22), and vegetables
(20), while fruits are under-represented because they are mostly unavailable during winters.
We calculate, in Table 4, several statistics that capture the extent to which the law of one price is
violated in the data. We ﬁrst focus on absolute LOP deviations. We calculate, in the spirit of Crucini,
Telmer and Zachariadis (2005), for each city and good in the sample, the log-deviation of a city’s price from
dispersion we are about to use below are not heavily inﬂuenced by the large real devaluations following large nominal exchange
rate swings and show consistently a negative relationship between RPV and NER volatility. Results of these regressions are
available from the author upon request.
20the cross-sectional average: dc






,w h e r epc
tg is the price of good g in city c at time t, and ¯ ptg the
cross-sectional average of the price of this particular good in period t. The law of one price predicts that dc
tg
should be centered at 0 in the absence of frictions that prevent goods-market arbitrage. As Table 4 indicates,
this proposition is grossly violated in our sample. We report, in the table, the median and interquartile range
of the distribution of dc
tg (across goods and time-periods), for each city in the sample. St. Petersburg (Russia)
is the most expensive city: prices here exceed the average price in the 12 cities by around 30% on average.
St. Petersburg is followed closely by Moscow (Russia) and Bucharest (Romania), whose prices are 26% and
23% higher, on average, than those of other cities in the sample. Cities in Ukraine and Moldova are least
expensive. Note also that these median statistics are large (in absolute value) relative to the interquartile
range of the distribution of d, suggesting that some cities are consistently over- (under-) priced for all goods
in our sample, in most time periods. Although large, absolute law of one price deviations are consistent with
economic theory. In particular, prices are more expensive in (relatively) rich countries (Russia and Belarus)17,
and cheaper in countries that are net exporters of agricultural products (Moldova and Ukraine)18.
We next turn to relative LOP deviations, deﬁned as ﬂuctuations of relative prices around a trend. Let
qi
tg b et h el o g - r e l a t i v ep r i c eo fg o o dg at time t for city pair i. We focus on the time-series properties of q in
order to characterize relative LOP deviations. In particular, we calculate the time-series standard deviation
of changes and levels of the relative price series in order to gauge the extent to which relative prices ﬂuctuate
over time. Note, in Table 4, that changes and levels of relative prices are very volatile in this data, with an
average standard deviation (across goods/city-pairs) in excess of 0.25 (changes) and 0.37 (levels). Fruits and
vegetables are more volatile than meat products and goods in the “other” product category, perhaps because
of the seasonal nature of these products, but also because of their perishability and diﬃculty to transport. A
positive, albeit small, border eﬀect is evident in the data: international relative prices are more volatile than
intranational ones: national borders increase the volatility of changes in relative prices by 2% (from 25 to
27%), and that of levels of relative prices by 9% (from 37 to 46%).
17According to the Penn World Tables, 6.1, output per capita in the countries in our sample is 0.28 (Russia), 0.24 (Belarus)
0.14 (Ukraine), 0.14 (Romania), 0.06 (Moldova) relative to that of the United States.
18According to statistics published by the World Trade Organization, Moldova and Ukraine are net exporters of foodstuﬀs,
with a ratio of exports to imports equal to 2.8 and 2.9, respectively. Belarus, Romania and Russia are net importers of food
products (with a ratio of exports to imports equal to 0.48, 0.49 and 0.35, respectively).
21We also calculate, for comparison, the average volatility of nominal exchange rates (deﬁned as the
time-series standard deviation of changes in the (log) nominal exchange rates in the periods between two
price surveys, usually at bi-weekly intervals). Nominal exchange rates are volatile, but much less so than
relative prices, once again suggesting that the environment we work with is an extremely volatile one, goods
prices are close to ﬂexible, and nominal shocks have a small eﬀect on the behavior of relative prices. This is,
then, the type of environment where the model predicts a negative relationship between nominal exchange
rate volatility and the variability of relative prices. Moreover, the model also predicts that law of one price
deviations should be larger when goods are more diﬃcult to transport across locations. We test these two
predictions of the model by estimating a cross-sectional gravity-type equation relating the time series volatility
of changes (or levels) of qi
tg for each of the 66 city pairs in our dataset to the volatility of nominal exchange
rates, a border dummy and the (great-circle) distance between the city-pairs. The border dummy captures the
numerous obstacles exporters face when crossing the border (including formal tariﬀ and other trade barriers,
but also informal dues/bribes they have to pay at customs checkpoints. Trade costs should also increase in
distance, as documented, for example, by Hummels (2001)19.
A limitation of the data is the fact that in several instances the agency samples the price data at
irregular intervals (1 or 3 weeks, as opposed to the usual 2 weeks)20. To calculate the volatility of biweekly
changes in relative prices, we assume that changes in relative prices are serially uncorrelated. Although this
is a strong assumption, we report results based on ﬁrst-diﬀerences in relative prices for comparability with
earlier work. The volatility of levels of relative prices is not subject to this limitation. The ﬁrst model we
estimate is
vol(∆q or q)gi = γ0 + γ1Borderi + γ2 log(distance)i + γ3std(∆e)i + µg + εgi (12)
where vol(∆q or q)gi is the time-series volatility of changes or levels of relative prices. We use two measures
19We have also experimented with additional variables aimed at capturing transport costs as well as homogeneity of preferences
across trading partners: a common language dummy, former Soviet Union dummy, adjacency dummy, weight-to-value ratio (kg/$)
of each good (Hummels (2001) documents that heavier goods are costlier to transport). None of these variables enter signiﬁcantly
and we have excluded them from the analysis.
20This, as well as the fact that price series are frequently interrupted because of missing data, precludes us from studying the
persistence of the relative price series without imposing additional assumptions on the data generating process.
22of relative price variability, the standard deviation, as well as the interquartile range. Given the excessive
volatility of the environment, the interquartile range is a more robust measure of LOP deviations given its
immunity to outliers. In addition, we include city and type of good (meat, fruit, vegetables) dummies in all
regressions.
This regression pools together all 58 goods in the sample. We assume that µg, the good speciﬁce ﬀect,
is uncorrelated with other regressors and estimate a random eﬀects GLS model. Table 5 presents the results.
Note ﬁrst that, consistent with the results of earlier studies, national borders and the distance between
locations have the expected positive eﬀect on relative price variability. The estimates of the importance
of the border relative to distance in generating relative price movements depend, however, on the measure
of relative prices used. National borders are an important source of relative price movements, relative to
distance, for conditional measures of price dispersion (the volatility of ﬁrst-diﬀerences of relative prices), but
unimportant for unconditional measures (the volatility of levels of relative prices). Given that the volatility of
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced relative prices measures short-term deviations from the law of one price, while that of levels
of relative prices is a long-run property of the series, one interpretation for this ﬁnding is that goods-market
arbitrage occurs with a lag, and transport costs only aﬀect the speed with each relative prices revert to the
mean, rather than the size of shocks to relative prices, an issue beyond the scope of this paper.
More importantly for our present discussion, note that the volatility of nominal exchange rates always
enters with a negative sign. Moreover, when the more robust interquartile range is used as a measure of
dispersion, coeﬃcient estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional signiﬁcance levels. The
dataset we use is therefore consistent with the predictions of the state-dependent sticky price model: larger
NER volatility generates less relative price variability in an environment in which costs of changing prices are
relatively low, idiosyncratic shocks volatile, and prices adjust frequently21.
Parsley and Wei (2001a) have used an alternative measure of deviations from the law of one price to
the time-series volatility of relative prices. Their paper studies the evolution of price dispersion over time and
therefore use a measure of price dispersion for every given period by calculating the volatility of ∆qt across
21We have performed several check to ensure the robustness of this results. A negative relationship between RPV and NER
volatility is present when we estimate the gravity equation above separately for diﬀerent good-categories, for goods of high/low
quality, and by eliminating subsets of cities from the sample. An iteratively weighted robust regression that penalizes outliers
produces qualitatively similar results.
23goods, rather than time. The reason movements in exchange rates generate relative price variability across
goods in sticky price models is staggered price adjustment: ﬁrms that adjust in diﬀerent periods have diﬀerent
relative prices. In our model, ﬁrm pricing is not synchronized because of diﬀerences in trade costs. For this
measure of law of one price deviations, the model predicts a similar hump-shaped relationship between price
dispersion and NER volatility: when NER volatility is suﬃciently high, more volatile nominal exchange rates
induce more frequent price adjustment, ﬁrms are more likely to synchronize their price changes and relative
price are therefore less volatile.
To test the robustness of the results in Table 5 we next use the cross-good rather than time-series
measure of price dispersion. Let qi
gt be again the relative price in period t for good g for city pair i. When
working with levels of relative prices, we detrend qi
gt by its time-series mean as in the long-run some cities
are more expensive than others: Qi
gt = qi
gt − ¯ qi




g to ﬁlter the data of good-speciﬁc trend growth in the relative price for a given
city pair. To calculate the volatility of nominal exchange rates in any given period, we use daily exchange
rate data and calculate the standard deviation of changes in daily nominal exchange rates in periods between
price collections22.
We next estimate the following system of time-series regressions, pooled over all city pairs:
vol(∆Q or Q)it = β0 + β1Borderi + β2 log(distance)i+β3std(∆e)it + µt + εit (13)
where i is an index over city pairs and t over time. Once again, our measures of volatility are the interquartile
r a n g ea n dt h es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o na n dw ea s s u m et h a tt i m e - s p e c i ﬁce ﬀects are uncorrelated with nominal
exchange rates. We also include city ﬁxed eﬀects and estimate the model again by using a random eﬀects
GLS speciﬁcation. As Table 6 suggests, the results of this exercise are consistent with those in the cross-
sectional regressions. Periods and city-pairs for which nominal exchange rates are less volatile suﬀer from
less price dispersion, consistent with the predictions of the model. In the appendix (Tables A2 and A3) we
also report results of an additional set of exercises in which we allow for a quadratic NER volatility term.
22Here we again assume that ∆Qi
gt is serially uncorrelated in order to compare observations in diﬀerent periods given the
irregular intervals between price collections.
24In all but one case, the (negative) eﬀect of NER volatility on law of one price deviations is strongest when
NER volatility is low and decreases towards zero as the volatility of NER increases. This pattern is again
consistent with the predictions of the model: eventually, as NER volatility increases suﬃciently, ﬁrms adjust
each period and nominal shocks have no real eﬀects, and suggests that the data we consider lies indeed on
the downward-sloping portion of the RPV-NER volatility relationship predicted by the model.
B. Evidence from Macro-Data
In our second exercise, we turn to aggregate CPI data for 74 countries for which the International
Financial Statistics have complete monthly CPI and nominal exchange rate data from 1973 to 1998. Earlier
research using aggregate price data has mainly focused on developed countries in which the volatility of
nominal exchange rates is relatively low and in which the model predicts a positive relationship between the
volatility of changes in relative prices and that of changes in nominal exchange rates. For example, Engel and
Rogers (2001) use consumer price indices in 12 European countries and ﬁnd evidence of a positive relationship
between RPV and NER volatility. In their sample monthly NER volatility ranges from 0 to 2%, which is
exactly the region where the model predicts a positive relationship. Identiﬁcation of a non-linear relationship
between real and nominal exchange rate volatility therefore requires a broader sample of countries, some of
which have experienced large NER movements.
Figure 6 presents scatter plots of RPV versus NER volatility for all 2700+ country pairs in the dataset
for diﬀerences at diﬀerent horizons23. The solid lines are the results of a locally-weighted regression in which
we weigh observations using Cleveland’s (1979) tricube function and employ a bandwidth length of 0.5. For
monthly changes in real exchange rates the aggregate data shows no evidence of a hump-shaped relationship:
real exchange rates are as volatile as nominal exchange rates even when the volatility of nominal exchange
rates exceeds 30%. As the ﬁgure indicates, aggregate relative price data does show evidence of a hump-shaped
relationship, but only for diﬀerences at large (24-month) horizons.
To formally test the predictions of the state-dependent model, we need a proxy that captures the degree
to which the bilateral country pairs in our sample are integrated. We make use of the increasing returns-
23For monthly changes, nominal and real exchange rate volatility are deﬁned as the standard deviation of et − et−1 and
qt −qt−1 respectively. For annual changes, we calculate the standard deviation of et −et−12 and qt −qt−12 and similarly for all
horizons.
25monopolistic competition model of international trade due to Krugman (1980), and its key implication, the
gravity equation, as derived for example, in Hummels (2001), to construct such a proxy. The typical prediction









where, assuming symmetry across varieties of the good produced in a given country, pj is the exporter’s price
(excluding the trade cost and expressed in the currency of the importer), Pi is the price index of country i, τ is
the iceberg transport cost, YiYj is the product of the two countries’ GDP, and θ the elasticity of substitution
across varieties. The state-dependent model predicts that real exchange rate volatility should decrease with
τ
−θ
ij , as ﬁrms that have larger export shares face stronger incentives to adjust prices in the presence of LOP
deviations. We use the bilateral trade dataset assembled by Rose (2004) in order to calculate a measure of
τ
−θ
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Assuming that trade costs and elasticities of substitution are time-invariant, relative prices stationary, and







is the time-series average of the (log) ratio of bilateral trade ﬂows to the product of the two partners’ GDP:
log
Mij+Mji
YiiYj . Annual bilateral trade ﬂow data is available for 1503 of the country-pairs in our sample and we
use this restricted sample to conduct formal inference.
We relate the volatility of bilateral real exchange rates (at four diﬀerent horizons) to nominal exchange
rate volatility, its square, as well as our measure of tradeability, by estimating an iteratively reweighted
regression which penalizes outliers by assigning them smaller weights24. Note, in Table 7, that tradeability
enters signiﬁcantly, with the negative sign predicted by the model: country-pairs that trade more suﬀer from
smaller RER ﬂuctuations. Coeﬃcient estimates are small however: a one-standard deviation (1.67) increase
24We use biweight weights in the last rounds of the algorithm with a tuning constant of 7 (implemented as rreg in Stata.)
26in this variable decreases the volatility of monthly changes in real exchange rates by only 0.02%25.C o e ﬃcient
estimates of the eﬀect of NER volatility on RER variability are consistent with those presented in Figure 6:
although the coeﬃcient on the squared term is negative at all horizons, it is small, in absolute value, and
indicative of a hump-shaped relationship only at horizons larger than one year: the eﬀect of NER volatility
on RER variability is negative only when the volatility of annual changes in nominal exchange rates exceeds
90%, or that of bi-annual changes exceeds 137%.
The last column of Table 7 focuses on the persistence of monthly exchange rate series (as measured
by their AR(1) coeﬃcient) for the pairs of countries in our dataset. Consistent with the predictions of the
model, real exchange rate ﬂuctuations are more transitory for pairs of countries that trade more and have
more volatile nominal exchange rates. The economic signiﬁcance of these two eﬀects is small however: a 10%
increase in nominal exchange rate volatility reduces the autoregressive coeﬃcient by only 0.013. The eﬀect
of tradeability is even smaller, much smaller than that predicted by the model (see Figure 4).
C. Discussion
We have shown above evidence that nominal exchange rate volatility lowers relative price variability
in a volatile environment in which we have computed relative prices using a dataset of actual goods prices,
evidence consistent with the predictions of a micro-founded sticky price model. The predictions of the model
are, however, violated in the aggregate price data, at least at horizons shorter than one year. In particular, we
have found no evidence of a hump-shaped relationship between RER and NER volatility in this environment.
What explains, then, the inability of the sticky price model to explain the behavior of aggregate relative
prices?
Recent research26 has emphasized the importance of aggregation and substitution biases in generating
a spurious correlation between nominal and real exchange rates. Because aggregate real exchange rates are
constructed using consumption-based price indices, they may reﬂect, at least in the short-run, substitution
by consumers towards cheaper, non-tradeable varieties of goods whose prices do not immediately respond to
exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Moreover, some of the properties (e.g. persistence) of the real exchange rate series
25This negative relationship is entirely absent in an ordinary least squares regression that weighs all observations equally.
26Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2002), Campa and Goldberg (2002), Imbs et. al. (2002), Taylor (2001).
27are heavily inﬂuenced by the behavior of its most volatile (i.e. non-tradeable) components. Crucini, Telmer
and Zachariadis (2005) provide support for this idea. They use a large dataset of actual transaction prices to
construct real exchange rate series immune to substitution biases and ﬁnd that (at 5-year horizons) real and
nominal exchange rates are weakly (in fact, negatively) correlated in a sample of European countries. Crucini
and Shintani (2004) show that the degree of a good’s tradeability aﬀects the behavior of its relative prices:
relative prices of tradeable goods are more transitory (half-lives less than 2 years) than the relative prices of
non-tradeable goods (half-lives in excess of 4 years). Moreover, aggregation of micro-price data considerably
over-estimates persistence due to the aggregation bias.
Unless aggregation bias is indeed important in generating the type of real exchange rate movements
observed in the data—this is a question whose resolution requires an extensive investigation of highly disag-
gregated relative price data, a sticky price model can only rationalize the lack of a hump-shaped relationship
between real and nominal exchange rate volatility if goods markets are suﬃciently segmented and most goods
trade little, either because of high trade costs of exporting goods, low elasticities of substitution, or bias in
preferences towards domestic varieties. Note that at longer horizons, the aggregate data is indeed consistent
with the model. At longer horizons movements in nominal exchange rates are more closely linked to funda-
mentals27 and are associated with ﬂuctuations in the marginal cost of production that increase the frequency
of adjustment even for ﬁrms that trade little abroad28. At short horizons, when nominal exchange rate
movements are disconnected from fundamentals and mostly aﬀect the relative price of domestic relative to
foreign goods, ﬁrms ﬁnd optimal to revise the frequency with which they change prices in response to volatile
nominal exchange rate movements only if they export suﬃciently abroad. Trade frictions are therefore an
important ingredient of a micro-founded sticky price model capable of replicating the relationship between
nominal and real exchange rate volatility in the data.
27Mark (1995)
28D e v e r e u xa n dY e t m a n( 2 0 0 2 )ﬁnd evidence that pass-through elasticities are larger for countries subject to more volatile
nominal exchange rate movements using annual data.
285. Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between international deviations from the law of one price and
nominal exchange rate volatility in the context of a state-dependent sticky price model. We show that the
model generates a hump-shaped relationship between the volatility of relative prices and nominal exchange
rate volatility. Firms that trade more have stronger incentives to adjust as they suﬀer from large shocks
to relative prices induced by nominal exchange rate movements, and are willing to pay the menu costs and
adjust more frequently. Tradeability therefore plays an important role in generating relative price movements
in sticky price models: for values of nominal exchange rate volatility similar to those for the US29, ﬁrms with
20% trade costs adjust three times more frequently than ﬁrms with zero costs of international trade. We
ﬁnd, using a dataset of actual goods prices in a relatively ﬂexible-price environment, that pairs of cities and
time-periods subject to more volatile nominal exchange rate movements tend to have smaller deviations from
the law of one price, consistent with the predictions of the model. A hump-shaped relationship between real
and nominal exchange rate volatility is also apparent in a dataset of CPI-based real exchange rates series for
74 countries following the Bretton-Woods period, albeit only at long horizons. At shorter horizons, real and
nominal exchange rate volatility are positively correlated even for countries that have suﬀered for excessively
large nominal exchange rate movements. Given that the model predicts a positive relationship only for ﬁrms
that face large costs of international trade (or a home bias in preferences/low elasticity of substitution), we
view this evidence as supportive of the view that international goods markets are far from being integrated.
Frictions that limit international goods market arbitrage are therefore important in generating the type of
real exchange rate movements observed in the data.
29The standard deviation of changes in eﬀective nominal exchange rates for US is 1.6% in the period from 1990 to 2003.
Source: IFS and author’s calculations.
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20 United Kingdom 10.2
21 United States 3.9
mean 11.87
Notes: All industrial sectors. OECD STAN Indicators Database, 1993




std. dev. 11.26 11.38
skewness 1.43 1.23
kurtosis 4.74 3.94
Notes: the mean of the distribution calculated based on OECD data in Table 1.  
The rest of the moments based on the distribution of export shares in the 
US Imports and Exports data at UC Davis.Table 3: Quantitative Properties of the Model
σ=1% σ=3%
A. Standard Deviation of Macroeconomic Aggregates
relative to consumption, first-differenced data
Consumption, % 0.14 0.21
Nominal Exchange Rates, Wages 7.4 13.8
Real Exchange Rates, Wages 5.0 5.0
Money supply 4.6 12.3
Price level 4.3 12.1
B. Average Duration of Price Spells, months
τ=1.02 firm 2.7 1.4
τ=1.20 firm 16.7 2.8
τ=1.48 firm 28.6 4.9
C. Relative Price Variability
standard deviation of changes in relative prices, %
τ=1.02 firm 0.53 0.42
τ=1.20 firm 0.98 1.64
τ=1.48 firm 1.10 2.27                 Table 4: Summary Statistics from Micro-Price data
Absolute PPP deviations log-deviation from cross-sectional mean
  (pooled over goods/time-periods)
By city
median iqr
St. Petersburg (Russia) 0.30 0.57
Moscow (Russia) 0.26 0.40
Bucharest (Romania) 0.23 0.37
Minsk (Belarus) 0.13 0.45
Odessa (Ukraine) -0.01 0.34
Kiev (Ukraine) -0.02 0.30
Tiraspol (Transdniester) -0.18 0.37
Cernovtsi (Ukraine) -0.20 0.52
Chisinau (Moldova) -0.20 0.38
Balti (Moldova) -0.22 0.38
Cahul (Moldova) -0.29 0.34
Causeni (Moldova) -0.35 0.40
Relative PPP deviations                  Time-Series standard deviation of bilateral relative prices







International pairs 0.26 0.46
Intranational pairs 0.24 0.37
NER volatility (std. dev. of log-changes) 0.042
(average across city-pairs separated by national borders)Table 5: Time-series volatility of relative prices
1234
std(∆q) iqr(∆q) std(q) iqr(q)
border 22.37 29.83 45.27 82.97
(12.93) (9.43) (6.38) (9.80)
log-distance 0.03 0.33 23.64 44.09
(3.69) (2.69) (3.91) (6.00)
std(∆NER) -1.90 -3.01 -0.09 -0.41
(1.55) (1.13) (0.13) (0.20)
# observations 3147 3147 3610 3610
adj. R
2
0.28 0.47 0.39 0.36
Notes:  1. Random-effects model 
2. Standard errors reported
3. Coefficient estimate and standard errors on log-distance and border multiplied by 1000
4. Regressions include meat/fruit/vegetable as well as city dummiesTable 6: Cross-goods volatility of relative prices
1234
std(∆Q) iqr(∆Q) std(Q) iqr(Q)
border 10.72 11.34 45.10 64.83
(4.76) (3.91) (3.86) (4.40)
log-distance -0.58 0.76 28.00 34.66
(3.49) (2.86) (2.74) (3.13)
std(∆NER) -0.72 -1.19 -0.72 -1.67
(0.52) (0.42) (0.41) (0.46)
# observations 6102 6102 6919 6919
adj. R
2
0.08 0.14 0.20 0.21
Notes:  1. Random effects model
2. Standard errors reported
3. Coefficient estimate and standard errors on log-distance and border multiplied by 1000
4. Regressions include city dummiesTable 7: CPI-based Real Exchange Rates
Bilateral RER volatility Persistence of monthly RER
1 month 3 months 12 months 24 months AR(1) coefficient
NER volatility 1.02 0.98 0.83 0.77 -0.13
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
NER volatility, squared -0.74 -0.62 -0.46 -0.28
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
tradeability -0.013 -0.054 -0.222 -0.385 -0.154
(0.004) (0.010) (0.035) (0.076) (0.04)
# observations 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503
summary statistics:
NER volatility 95th percentile 0.19 0.38 1.07 1.80
5th percentile 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10
tradeability std. dev. 1.67
AR(1) coefficient: monthly RER mean 0.97
Notes: results of a iteratively reweighted regression reported
             coefficients and standard errors on "tradeability" multiplied by 100




























log-deviation of past price from optimum 









































































































































std(∆q) for τ=1.2 firm 







std(∆q) for τ=1.48 firm

























3 Periods btw adjustment, τ=1.20
NER volatility, %








3Periods btw adjustment, τ=1.48 


























































σ: Nominal exchange rate volatility, %
std(ε), %



































































































The typical approach used in solving state-dependent pricing or inventory models is the simulation
technique proposed by Krusell and Smith (1997) and used by Willis(2002) and Khan and Thomas(2001) in
models with non-convexities. The method involves replacing the distribution of the ﬁrms’ last period’s prices
with a vector of its moments, postulating a linear relationship between aggregate prices and quantities and
the state of the world, and solving for the unknown coeﬃcients of these approximants by minimizing their
in-sample forecast errors.
We depart slightly from the standard method, and use a solution technique free of simulations, one
that draws heavily on collocation, a residual-based functional approximation method discussed at length in
Miranda and Fackler (2002). A simulation-free solution technique used to solve models with heterogeneous
agents was originally suggested by den Haan (1997) in the context of an uninsurable idiosyncratic risks
model. The advantage of this solution method is its explicit reliance on numerical theory, as the nodes at
which equilibrium conditions are solved, and the basis functions used in approximation, are chosen to ensure
optimality of the approximants.
Before discussing how we solve for the aggregate prices and quantities, we turn to the solution of the
ﬁrm’s problem.
We solve the system of two functional equations that characterize the ﬁrm’s problem in (see equation
10) using collocation. More speciﬁcally, we approximate each of the two value functions using a linear
combination of N Chebyshev polynomials. To solve for the 2N unknown coeﬃcients, we require that the
Bellman equations hold at 2N nodes in the state space. This condition yields 2N equations we use to solve for
the unknown coeﬃcients. In addition, one needs to solve the ﬁrm’s maximization problem in (10) and evaluate
the expectations on the RHS of the Bellman equation by discretizing the distribution of shocks and integrating
using Gaussian quadrature. We evaluate the accuracy of our solution method by calculating the diﬀerence in
the two sides of the Bellman equations for points other than the collocation nodes. These residuals are small
(less than 5×10−4 in absolute value) and are equioscillatory, a property typical of Chebyshev approximations.
We next turn to the solution of the equilibrium conditions. We have found that the most eﬃcient
approximation to the distribution of last period’s prices (conditional on trade costs) is the mean of thedeviations of the ﬁrms’ last period’s prices from their steady-state optimum, ˆ µt =
˜ pt−1(z)
˜ pss(z) as there is little
variation in this moment across ﬁrms of diﬀerent types and introducing a higher moment adds little precision
to our approximation to the aggregate functions. The following ﬁve functional equations (in ﬁve unknown
functions: C(s), ˜ P(s), ˜ W(s), ˜ e(s),Γ(s)w h e r es =( g,ˆ µ) is the state of the world, and Γ(s) the law of motion
of µ, are suﬃcient to characterize the equilibrium of this economy:
˜ W(s)
























where ˜ p(z;s) are the prices that solve the ﬁrms’ problems, and ˜ p(z)t h eﬁrm’s steady-state optimal price.
We solve for the aggregate functions by replacing them with a combination of Chebyshev polynomials.
Given an initial guess for the coeﬃcients on these polynomials, we solve the ﬁrm’s problems and recompute
a new set of aggregate quantities and prices at each state of the world used to discretize the state-space. We
approximate the unknown functions using a relatively small number of basis functions (typically K = 64; 8
for each dimension in the aggregate state-space) but solving the model at a larger number of nodes (typically
M = 144) and retrieving the unknown coeﬃcients by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. For example,
letting ˜ P be a M ×1 vector of home prices that satisfy the equilibrium conditions at each node, Φ be a M ×K




˜ P − Φc
´0 ³
˜ P − Φc
´
This set of coeﬃcients for all aggregate variables is used to re-solve the ﬁrm’s problem, obtain a set of
new aggregate variables at each node and calculate a new c. The convergence criterion is the norm of the
diﬀerence between the last two sets of c and we typically stop when norm < 10−5. Once the algorithm
converges, our approximants produce accurate out-of sample forecasts, and explain 95% of the variation of
aggregate variables in simulations of the model.Table A1: Data Availability
           (proportion available)
By City: 
city country
1 Chisinau Moldova 0.97
2 Balti Moldova 0.93
3 Cahul Moldova 0.93
4 Causeni Moldova 0.89
6 Tiraspol Transdniester 0.82
7 Bucharest Romania 0.91
8 St. Petersburg Russia 0.80
9 Moscow Russia 0.75
10 Kiev Ukraine 0.81
11 Odessa Ukraine 0.85
12 Cernovtsi Ukraine 0.89
13 Minsk Belarus 0.31
By good:
grade 1  grade 2 grade 1 grade 2
meat vegetables
1 chicken legs 0.77 0.77
2 pork legs 0.87 0.88 16 tomatoes 0.85 0.85
3 pork w/ bones 0.87 0.87 17 sugar beet 0.87 0.87
4 beef ribs 0.85 0.85 18 potatoes 0.87 0.87
5 beef w/ bones 0.86 0.86 19 dry beans 0.76 0.76
6 beef legs 0.86 0.87 20 carrots 0.86 0.87
7 beef fillet 0.87 0.87 21 sweet pepper 0.71 0.71
8 mutton 0.70 0.69 22 garlic 0.86 0.86
9 chicken 0.76 0.76 23 onions 0.86 0.87
10 pork fillet 0.86 0.87 24 cabbage 0.87 0.87
11 pork ribs 0.85 0.86 25 cucumber 0.81 0.81
fruit other
12 grapes 0.69 0.69 26 honey 0.87 0.87
13 apples 0.86 0.86 27 sugar 0.86 0.87
14 walnut 0.77 0.78 28 oil 0.87 0.87
15 walnut w/o  shells 0.58 0.58 29 eggs 0.86 0.87Table A2: Time-series volatility of relative prices





std(∆NER), squared 205.51 -13.26
(76.62) (6.53)
Effect of std(∆NER) on RPV when std(∆NER) is at its




95th percentile -0.31 -1.59
(1.52) (0.61)
Notes:  1. Random-effects model 
2. Standard errors reported
3. Coefficient estimate and standard errors on log-distance and border multiplied by 1000






std(∆NER), squared 43.41 150.67
(57.03) (57.56)
Effect of std(∆NER) on RPV when std(∆NER) is at its




95th percentile -0.96 -0.83
(0.51) (0.55)
Notes:  1. Random effects model
2. Standard errors reported
3.The last 3 rows report the derivative of RPV wrt. NER volatility for 3 different values of NER volatility
4. Regressions include city dummies